A Distinct Judicial Power

• Provides the first comprehensive exegesis of the origins of judicial independence in the United States
• Brings together a wealth of information (charters, instructions, statutes, etc.) about the judicial power between 1606 and 1787, and sometimes beyond, which allows the reader to more easily understand the concepts
• Discusses pre-Marbury v. Madison precedents for judicial review, including several previously unknown precedents
• Articulates a new theory about the origins of judicial review: one that emphasizes the connection between judicial review and the rise of judicial independence
• Provides a devastating critique of popular constitutionalism, an influential theory of constitutional interpretation that argues that judicial review should be drastically limited or eliminated altogether

Readership: Professors, students, scholars, etc. of legal history, constitutional law, political science

Scott Douglas Gerber, Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University

Scott Douglas Gerber is Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University and Senior Research Scholar in Law and Politics at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center. He teaches constitutional law and American legal history. He received both his Ph.D. and J.D. from the University of Virginia, and his B.A. from the College of William and Mary. His previous books include: The Declaration of Independence: Origins and Impact; First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas; Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall; and To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation. He has also published two novels.

"Beginning with a review of the intellectual history of judicial independence from Aristotle to John Adams, Gerber thoroughly chronicles the rise of protojudicial independence in the original thirteen colonies' foundational texts and practices. Gerber persuasively describes the colonies as lurching toward judicial independence slowly and unevenly, yet steadily." - Harvard Law Review.

"Gerber's book is by far the most comprehensive examination of the manner by which colonial and state constitutions contributed to the federal Constitution His study not only highlights the legacy of the aforementioned area to the creation of Article III of the Constitution, but renews interest in the contribution of John Adams to the development of the courts and opens new ground about the relationship between judicial review and judicial independence." - Samuel B. Hoff, Law and Politics Book Review.

"A valuable summary of the development of local judicial institutions that provides a welcome resource for students of the colonial and Revolutionary eras." - Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Tulsa Law Review.

"There is much to praise in A Distinct Judicial Power. Tracing the history of a separate judicial branch as it developed in America is an important task in itself. Bringing together the experience of every one of the thirteen colonies in the development of its judiciary is a boon to us all." - Joyce Lee Malcolm, George Mason University School of Law.

"Reason Papersber has authored a timely and thorough treatise on judicial review that traces the concept through 3,000 years of political thought. He also has provided an in-depth historical analysis on this country's struggles to create an independent judiciary founded on a compensation and tenure structure not subject to political whim." - Gerald Rafferty, Colorado Lawyer

"Beginning with a review of the intellectual history of judicial independence from Aristotle to John Adams, Gerber thoroughly chronicles the rise of protojudicial independence in the original thirteen colonies foundational texts and practices. Gerber persuasively describes the colonies as lurching toward judicial independence slowly and unevenly, yet steadily." - Harvard Law Review

Preface
A Note on Methodology
The Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary
1: The History of Ideas: From Aristotle's Theory of a Mixed Constitution to John Adams's Modifications of Montesquieu
2: Article III of the Constitution of the United States
II The Judicial Power in the Original Thirteen States and Their Colonial Antecedents
3: Virginia: Constitutionalizing Judicial Independence Prior to the U.S. Constitution
4: Massachusetts: A "Safety-Valve" Theory of Judicial Independence
5: New Hampshire: Judicial Review in the Rockingham County Inferior Court
6: Maryland: Chancellor Theodorick Bland and Salaries that "ought to be secured"
7: Connecticut: Disestablishment and Judicial Independence
8: Rhode Island: Last Bastion of Legislative Supremacy
9: North Carolina: Governor Thomas Burke and the Origins of Judicial Review
10: South Carolina: Judicial Review without an Independent Judiciary
11: New Jersey: The First State Court Precedent for Judicial Review
12: New York: Persistent Threats to Judicial Independence
13: Pennsylvania: (Almost) Adopting the Federal Model
14: Delaware: A High Court of Errors and Appeals
15: Georgia: Ineffective and Dependent Judges
Judicial Independence, Judicial Review, and Individual Rights
16: Conclusion
Appendix: Popular Constitutionalism-The Contemporary Assault on Judicial Review
Works Cited
Index