New to this edition
Readership: Academics and students studying auctions, the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.
Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland, and Paulo K. Monteiro, Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
"Although the book focuses squarely on auctions, it is likely to be helpful in courses dealing with information economics generally. A particular virtue of the book is the tangible, hands-on, approach taken to explaining the revelation principle...a very helpful collection of core results and techniques." - John Asker Economic Record
1: Introduction 2: Preliminaries 3: Private Values 4: Common Value 5: Affiliated Values 6: Mechanism Design 7: Multiple Objects 8: Guide to current developments in auction theory A: Probability B: Differential Equations C: Affiliation D: Convexity References
