This collection of original essays explores the social and relational dimensions of individual autonomy. Rejecting the feminist charge that autonomy is inherently masculinist, the contributors draw on feminist critiques of autonomy to challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical debates about agency, identity, and moral responsibility. The essays analyse the complex ways in which oppression can impair an agent's capacity for autonomy, and investigate connections, neglected by standard accounts, between autonomy and other aspects of the agent, including self-conception, self-worth, memory, and the imagination.
Readership: Scholars and students of moral philosophy and gender studies.
Edited by Catriona Mackenzie, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Macquarie University, and Natalie Stoljar, Lecturer in Philosophy, Australian National University
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar: Introduction: Autonomy refigured Part 1: Autonomy and the Social 1: Marilyn Friedman: Autonomy, social disruption and women 2: Linda Barclay: Autonomy and the social self 3: Paul Benson: Feeling crazy: self worth and the social character of responsibility 4: Natalie Stoljar: Autonomy and the feminist intuition 5: Genevieve Lloyd: Individuals, responsibility and the philosophical imagination 6: Catriona Mackenzie: Imagining oneself otherwise 7: Diana Tietjens Meyers: Intersectional identity and the authentic self?: Opposites attract 8: Lorraine Code: The perversion of autonomy and the subjection of women: discourses of social advocacy at century's end Part II: Relational Autonomy in Context 9: Susan Dodds: Choice and control in feminist bioethics 10: Anne Donchin: Autonomy and interdependence: quandaries in genetic decision-making 11: Carlyn McLeod and Susan Sherwin: Relational autonomy, self-trust, and health care for patients who are oppressed 12: Susan J. Brison: Relational autonomy and freedom of expression
