Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists do so in terms of symmetry and invariance. This book argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. The author analyses and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe that there are. He argues that we should discard the idea of law as an inadequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the book develops the empiricist view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. Concepts of symmetry, transformation, and invariance illuminate the structure of such models. A central role is played in science by symmetry arguments, and it is shown how these function also in the philosophical analysis of probability. The advocated approach presupposes no realism about laws or necessities in nature.

Readership: Philosophers (metaphysics, epistemiology), Philosophers of science and physics.

Bas C. van Fraassen, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University

"`innovative if not provocative Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, Vol 22, No 3-5 Dec 93"

"`a marvelously clear and incisive exposition of the problems facing definitions of laws of nature The Philosophical Review, Vol 102, No 3 (July 1993)"

"`the real excitement and power of the book comes from the new perspective it brings.' Times Higher Education Supplement"

"`I wholeheartedly recommend this book. There are many things to be learnt from it, not least its incisive criticisms of "more metaphysical" theories of laws. The work is executed with great erudition and panache.' Peter Menzies, Australian National University"