Firms, Organizations and Contracts

What is a firm? Why do firms exist? How is production and administration best co-ordinated? What are the reasons for vertical integration? And disintegration? Is there a conflict between establishing and developing long-term relationships on the one hand, and the operation of free market competition on the other? Is there a choice between markets and hierarchies? What about networks and clans? These questions continue to be explored with economics, management, sociology and other related disciplines.

Firms, Organizations and Contracts brings together the best inter-disciplinary analysis of the topic, and contains classic contributions and material not normally seen by those outside their own particular disciplines. It combines pioneer articles with more recent discussions of an area attracting growing attention amongst those studying industrial organization - whether on courses in economics, management, strategy, organization, law or public administration.

The volume includes Coase's initial enquiry into `The Nature of the Firm' and Ouchi's analysis of `Markets, bureaucracies and clans'; Kaldor's questioning of `The Nature of the Firm' and Dore's discussion of `Goodwill and the spirit of market capitalism'.

This book will be an invaluable tool for students in economics, management and sociology. In view of the growing use of contracts within the public sector, and within the private regulated sector, the book also sets out some of the key issues of concern to policy makers and public sector strategists.

Readership: Students of business, economics, and management.

Edited by Peter J. Buckley, Professor of International Business, University of Leeds, and Jonathan Michie, Professor of Management and Business Studies at Birkbeck College, University of London

Coase: Foreword
Introduction and Overview:
I: Theory of the Firm
Kaldor: The Equilibrium of the Firm
Coase: The Nature of the Firm
Richardson: The Organization of Industry
Alchain and Demsetz: Production, Information, and Economic Organization
Jensen and Meckling: The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
Hart: An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
II: Markets and Industrial Organization
Williamson: Transaction Cost Economies
Kreps: Corporate Culture and Economic Theory
Mariti and Smiley: Co-operative Agreeements and the Organization of Industry
Imai and Itami: Interpenetration of Firm and Market
Blois: Vertical Quasi-Integration
Macaulay: Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
Dore: Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism
III: Joint Ventures, Networks, Clans, and Alliances
Pfeffer and Nowak: Joint Ventures and Interorganizational Dependence
Buckley and Casson: A Theory of Co-operation in International Business
Miles and Snow: Organizations: New Concepts for New Forms
Ouchi: Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans
Milgrom and Roberts: Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future