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James Phillips
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Philosophical perspectives
Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti
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Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
Lisa Bortolotti
318 pages
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234x156mm
978-0-19-920616-2
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Paperback
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12 November 2009
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- An interdisciplinary book that will interest philosophers of mind, epistemologists, philosophers of science, cognitive psychologists, psychiatrists and mental health professionals.
- An original analysis of the debate on the nature of delusions, offering a solution to the much contested issue whether delusions are beliefs, while developing a new theory of how beliefs are ascribed.
- Includes clear and interesting examples to help elucidate complex arguments, and avoids technical language where possible.
Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia, dementia and other psychiatric disorders. Though delusion is commonly defined as a false and irrational belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational.
The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book is that delusions are continuous with ordinary beliefs, a thesis that could have not only significant theoretical implications for debates in the philosophy of mind and
psychology, but also practical implications for psychiatric classification and the clinical treatment of subjects with delusions.
Based on recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, the book offers a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition, defends the doxastic conception of delusions, and develops a theory about the role of judgements of rationality and self-knowledge in belief ascription.
Readership: Philosophers of mind, philosophers of
science, epistemologists, cognitive scientists, psychiatrists and mental health professionals.
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Acknowledgements
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription
3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription
4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription
5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge
6: Conclusions
Bibliography and Reference List
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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