Readership: Academics, researchers, and advanced students interested in game theory and/or the formation of groups and coalitions
Debraj Ray, Julius Silver Professor of Economics, New York University
"beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist" - B. Douglas Bernheim, Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics, Stanford University
"A must for anyone who wishes to discover the treasures hidden within the cooperative approach." - Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University and New York University
"Ray's substantial accomplishments in this area will inspire researchers and students alike." - Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business
"a masterful account" - Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics
Preface 1: Introduction Part 1 The Setting 2: Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements 3: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation Part 2 The Bargaining Approach to Coalitions Formation 4: Irreversible Agreements 5: Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games 6: Applications 7: Irreversible Agreements: The General Case 8: A Framework for Reversible Commitments 9: Reversible Agreements Without Externalities 10: Reversible Agreements With Externalities Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation 11: Blocking 12: Irreversible Commitments 13: The Blocking Approach in Real Time 14: Directions
