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New Research in Corporate Finance and Banking
Edited by Bruno Biais and Marco Pagano
375 pages
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numerous tables and figures
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234x156mm
978-0-19-924324-2
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Paperback
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18 April 2002
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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within 5-10 days.
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- An invaluable reference tool for scholars in the field of financial economics
- Reflects the depth and breadth of the research interests of European scholars in financial economics
In recent years, European financial economists have been brought together, via research projects and bubble01ces, by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). These fruitful interactions have contributed to the development of financial economics in Europe, and have generated a strong flow of interesting writing—-both theoretical and empirical—-in the fields of financial markets and corporate finance.
One of the common questions posed by researchers in this field is why security markets have such different roles and importance relative to banks in different countries. A related issue is
whether these different financial arrangements matter for the functioning of the real economy. The first section of this volume approaches these issues by focusing on the functioning of the primary equity market, or the process by which companies 'go public', which marks the transition from complete reliance on bank financing to partial reliance on security markets. The second section approaches these issues at a 'systemic' level, attempting to identify the comparative advantages of banks and security markets in solving the information problems involved in financing companies. The third section explores the variety in the design of credit contracts and institutions, asking questions like: Why do some companies borrow from a single bank and others from several banks? Why do some banks share
information about their customers? The final section illustrates that the same informational frictions that explain the design of credit contracts and institutions can also affect real economic activity.Readership: Economists and advanced students of economics with an interest in finance, corporate finance, and monetary economics.
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Edited by Bruno Biais, Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse, and Marco Pagano, University of Salerno Contributors:
Bruno Biais, Université des Sciences Sociales
Marco Pagano, University of Salerno
Antonio S. Mello, University of Wisconsin
John E. Parsons, CEPR
Fabio Panetta, Banca d'Italia
Luigi Zingales, University of Chicago
M. J. Brennan, University of California
J. Franks, London Business School
Arnoud W. A. Boot, University of Amsterdam
Anjan V. Thakor, University of Michigan
A. Jorge Padilla, CEPR
Tullio Jappelli, CEPR
Jeremy Bulow, Federal Trade Commission
Ming Huang, Stanford University
Paul Klemperer, Oxford University
Michel A. Habib, London Business School
Alexander P. Ljungqvist, New York University
Javier Suarez, CEMFI, Madrid
Oren Sussman, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Patrick Bolton, Princeton University
David S. Scharfstein, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Bruno Biais and Marco Pagano: Introduction
I. Going Public1: Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales: Why Do Companies Go Public?: An Empirical Analysis
2: M. J. Brennan and J. Franks: Underpricing, Ownership, and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK
3: Antonio S. Mello and John E. Parsons: Going Public and the Ownership Structure of the Firm
4: Jeremy Bulow, Ming, Huang, and Paul Klemperer: Toeholds and Takeovers
5: Michel A. Habib and Alexander P. Ljungqvist: Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence
II. Financial System Architecture6: Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor: Financial System Architecture
7: Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor: Banking Scope and Financial Innovation
III. Design of Credit Contracts and Institutions8: Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein: Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors
9: Marco Pagano and Tullio Jappelli: Information Sharing in Credit Markets
10: A. Jorge Padilla and Marco Pagano: Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives
IV. Credit Market Imperfections and Economic Activity11: Luigi Zingales: Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest?: Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry
12: Javier Suarez and Oren Sussman: Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz—Weiss Economy
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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