Readership: Scholars and students of Political Science, European Union, Political Economy, International Relations, Comparative Constitutional Law
Mark A. Pollack, University of Wisconsin-Madison and European University Institute
"What is fresh about this investigation of European Union institutions by Mark Pollack is that it operates within a clear analytic framework provided by principal-agency theory. This has a number of advantages over traditional descriptive accounts ... The book also serves a highly useful purpose in focussing much of the relevant literature on principal-agency theory from both sides of the Atlantic as it applies to the Union." - Journal of Public Policy
"Pollack has written an excellent book from a fresh perspective which provides a most welcome challenge to much conventional writing on the European Union and its institutions." - Journal of Public Policy
"... will interest scholars, students and policy researchers of EU affairs." - KnowEurope
Introduction: Theory, Hypotheses and Research Design 1: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Union Part I: Delegation and Discretion 2: The Commission as an Agent: Delegation of Executive Power in the EU 3: The Court of Justice as an Agent: Delegation of Judicial Power in the EU 4: The European Parliament an an Outlier: Delegation of Legislative Powers in the EU Part II: Agency and Agenda-Setting 5: Liberalizing Europe: The Commission, the Court, and the Creation of a European Market 6: Regulating Europe: The Commission, the Court, and the Regulation of the European Market Conclusions: A Europe of Agents, A World of Agents
