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Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States
Paul Windolf
256 pages
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numerous tables and figures
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234x156mm
978-0-19-925697-6
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Hardback
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17 October 2002
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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within 5-10 days.
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- Cross-country comparisons
- Analyses both corporate and elite networks
- Based on a large sample of firms in Europe and the United States
- Illustrates how large corporations coordinate their behaviour
- Offers insights into the functioning of different market orders in Europe and the US
Corporate networks form part of the institutional structure of markets and the business environment, enabling firms to coordinate their behaviour and regulate competition. Networks perform a number of economic functions: they reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty, and facilitate the redistribution of risk between banks, firms, and investors. Within these networks, firms collectively monitor one another and owners supervise their managers.
Part One analyses comparative data on interlocking directorates and capital networks between the large corporations in six countries: Germany, Great Britain, France,
the United States, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.
The structure of corporate networks is shaped by the traditions, culture, and institutions of a country. The German corporate network, for instance, is highly centralized and includes almost all large corporations. The network in the United States, however, is decentralized and falls into a number of regional centres.
Corporate networks may be considered as a configuration of firms that are connected to one another by managers (interlocks). Networks may also be considered as a configuration of managers who meet each other on the board of directors (network of the economic elite). The resources on which the dominance of the economic elite is based are bureaucratic power, property rights, and
social capital. The top managers not only have a leading position within large corporations (bureaucratic power), they also represent the owner vis-à-vis the dependent firm on whose board they sit. Thus, bureaucratic control over a company is linked with property rights in the context of specific network configurations. These configurations vary between countries and lead to differing forms of managerial control in Germany, France, Britain, and the United States (Part Two of the book).
Part Three concentrates on corporate networks and the structure of the market order in the transitional economies. The type of capitalism that is evolving in these countries in some ways resembles Western managerial capitalism, but with certain significant differences. Privatization
created a relatively high concentration of ownership. There is no clear-cut separation of ownership and control, but rather a balance of power between managers and owners.
Readership: Academics and graduate students of business, economics, sociology, and comparative politics
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Paul Windolf, University of Trier
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1: Introduction
Part I: Corporate Networks
2: The Structure of Corporate Networks
3: Network Structures in Germany and Britain
4: The Evolution of French Capitalism
Part II: Elite Networks
5: Elite Networks in Germany and Britain
6: Education and Career of Multiple Directors
Part III: Post-socialist Networks
7: Corporate Networks in Eastern Germany
8: Privatization and Corporate Networks in Eastern Europe
Part IV: Outlook
9: From Corporatism to Shareholder-Value
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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