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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet
328 pages
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234x156mm
978-0-19-925736-2
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Hardback
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04 September 2003
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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within 5-10 days.
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- A very timely collection of brand-new essays on this thriving topic
- Bridges the gap between moral philosophy and philosophy of action/psychology
- Superb international line-up of contributors
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally.
Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as
group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.Readership: Scholars and students of philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind and ethics.
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Edited by Sarah Stroud, Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Canada, and Christine Tappolet, Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Canada Contributors:
Sarah Stroud, McGill University, Canada
Christine Tappolet, University of Montreal
Michael Smith, Australian National University
Richard Holton, University of Edinburgh
Philip Pettit, Princeton University
Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto
Gary Watson, University of California, Riverside
Ralph Wedgwood, University of Oxford
Duncan MacIntosh, Dalhousie
University
Joseph Heath, University of Toronto
Ronald de Sousa, University of Toronto
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"... an attractive volume ... Combining all the references together at the end proved to be very helpful as did the fine index ... this volume represents an important contribution to action theory, philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and should be read by anyone who works in these areas." - Journal of Moral Philosophy "...a valuable resource for anyone interested in the nature of rational action." - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet: Introduction
1: Michael Smith: Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion
2: Richard Holton: How is Strength of Will Possible?
3: Philip Pettit: Akrasia, Collective and Individual
4: Christine Tappolet: Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action
5: Sarah Stroud: Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement
6: Sergio Tenenbaum: Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation
7: Gary Watson: The Work of the Will
8: Ralph Wedgwood: Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly
9: Duncan MacIntosh: Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons
10: Joseph Heath: Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory
11: Ronald de Sousa: Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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