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The Control of Corporate Europe
Edited by Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht
356 pages
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numerous figures and tables
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234x156mm
978-0-19-925753-9
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Paperback
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10 October 2002
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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within 5-10 days.
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- First comparative study of voting control of European corporations based on new EU disclosure standard
- Covers Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
- Accessible comparative tables and introductory chapter
- Written by a leading international team of authors
Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of
corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements. Readership: Researchers on corporate governance and corporate finance in the fields of economics, business studies, and management science;
corporate secretaries and corporate finance directors; those working for financial institutions (in particular pension funds and investments banks).
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Edited by Fabrizio Barca, Italian Finance Ministry and University of Sienna, and Marco Becht, European Corporate Governance Institute and Free University of Brussels Contributors:
Jonas Agnblad (Nordic Capital - leveraged buy-out fund in Stockholm)
Fabrizio Barca (Italian Treasury/Sienna University)
Marco Becht (Institute for European Studies/Solvay Business School/Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Erik Berglof (Stockholm School of Economics/CEPR)
Marcello Bianchi (Consob - Stock Exchange and Public Companies Italian Authority)
Magda Bianco (Bank of Italy)
Laurence
Bloch (Technical Adviser, French Foreign Trade Ministry)
Ekkehart Boehmer (New York Stock Exchange)
Ariane Chapelle (Solvay Business School/Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Rafel Crespi-Cladera (Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona)
Abe de Jong (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
Luca Enriques (University of Bologna)
Miguel Garcia-Cestona (Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona)
Marc Goergen (UMIST)
Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna)
Peter Hogfeldt (Stockholm School of Economics)
Rezaul Kabir (University of Tilburg)
Susanne Kalss (University of Klagenfurt)
Elizabeth Kremp (Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry, France)
Teye Marra (University of Groningen)
Colin Mayer (Said Business School)
Luc Renneboog (University of Tilburg)
Ailsa Roell (Princeton University)
Alex Stomper (University of Vienna)
Helena Svancar (Enskilda Securities - Nordic investment bank)
Josef Zechner (University of Vienna)
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"This book gives the first comprehensive picture of large corporate holdings in the EU and will become a standard reference book on the subject." - Financial Adviser
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1: M. Becht and C. Mayer: The Control of Corporate Europe
2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria
3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and Control in the Netherlands
8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms
9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and Control in Sweden—-Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control
10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
Appendix IThe Large Holdings Directive
Appendix IIComparative Tables
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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