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The Structure of Regulatory Competition
Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy
Dale D. Murphy
336 pages
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Various charts/ graphs
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234x156mm
978-0-19-926751-4
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Hardback
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22 January 2004
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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within 5-10 days.
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- Interdisciplinary: incorporates political science, economics, legal, and business studies
- Includes historical narratives on the role of powerful firms in shaping public policies, for example on the origins of offshore banking
- Sheds new empirical light on the heated controversy over corporate social responsibility
In order to understand international economic regulations, it is essential to understand the variation in competing corporations' interests. Political science theories have neglected the role of individual firms as causal actors. Theories of institutions have neglected to examine the creation of business law. Economic theories have neglected to apply concepts of asset specificity to social regulations in competitive industries. This book aims to fill these voids with a company-based explanation. Its theoretical findings open a 'black box' in the literature on international political economy and elucidate a source of regulatory differences and similarities.
Counter-intuitive case studies reveal how business and governments actually
interact. They also contribute to both sides of current debates over corporate social responsibility. They examine diverse topics including offshore finance, flags-of-convenience, CFC production, capital requirements, the importation and sale of 'dolphin-lethal' tuna, and the advertising of infant formulae.
By exploring powerful corporations' investment profiles and regulatory strategies, this book explains why globalization sometimes results in a 'race to the bottom', sometimes in higher common regulations, and sometimes in regulations that differ between countries. Uniquely, it then explains which regulatory outcome is likely to occur under specified conditions. The explanation incorporates economics, political science, studies of regulatory capture, and
examinations of transaction costs, firms' regulatory strategies, and the roles international institutions.
Readership: Academics and graduate students in political science, law, business, and economics, also practitioners, business associations, policy advocates, policy critics, and government or NGO officials.
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Dale D. Murphy, Assistant Professor, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
1: The Puzzle, An Explanation, and Theoretical Foundations
PART II: LOWER COMMON DENOMINATOR
2: Shipping Flags-of-Convenience
3: Offshore Finance
PART III: HIGHER COMMON DENOMINATOR
4: Montreal Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons
5: Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy
PART IV: HETEROGENEITY
6: Mexican Tuna-Dolphin
7: U.S. Infant Formula Marketing
PART V: CONCLUSION
8: Evidence from the Case Studies, and Implications
Bibliography
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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