Microeconomic Theory

• Topics covered are central in any graduate economics program
• Useful as a reference because each topic discussion is self-contained
• Provides an advanced treatment of each topic

Readership: Graduate students and instructors in microeconomics; Students in related fields of economics, researchers in microeconomics and others requiring reference material in the book.

James Bergin, Professor of Economics, Queen's University, Ontario

1: Decision Theory
2: Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance
3: Strategic Form Games
4: Nash Equilibrium- Existence and Refinements
5: Mechanism Design
6: Auctions I: Independent Values
7: Auctions II: Dependent Values
8: Extensive Form Games
9: Equilibrium in Extensive Game Forms
10: Repeated Games
11: Bargaining
12: Information
13: The Principal-Agent Problem
14: Signaling
15: Screening
16: Common Knowledge
17: Mechanism Design: Complete and Incomplete Information
18: Cooperative Outcomes
19: Large Games
20: Evolution and Learning