Readership: Scholars and students of philosophical logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Edited by JC Beall, University of Connecticut, and Bradley Armour-Garb, University at Albany, SUNY
Introduction 1: JC Beall: Transparent disquotationalism 2: Hartry Field: Is the Liar sentence both true and false? 3: Graham Priest: Spiking the field artillery 4: Hartry Field: Variations on a theme by Yablo 5: Paul Horwich: A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth 6: Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall: Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox 7: Greg Restall: Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too 8: Michael Glanzberg: Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes 9: Anil Gupta: Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism? 10: Christopher Gauker: Semantics for deflationists 11: Dorothy Grover: How significant is the Liar? 12: Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten: The deflationists' axioms for truth 13: Alan Weir: Naive truth and sophisticated logic 14: Jody Azzouni: Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes
