Readership: Scholars and students of
philosophical logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Edited by JC Beall, University of Connecticut, and Bradley Armour-Garb, University at Albany, SUNY
1: JC Beall: Transparent disquotationalism
2: Hartry Field: Is the Liar sentence both true and false?
3: Graham Priest: Spiking the field artillery
4: Hartry Field: Variations on a theme by Yablo
5: Paul Horwich: A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth
6: Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall: Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox
7: Greg Restall: Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too
8: Michael Glanzberg: Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes
9: Anil Gupta: Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?
10: Christopher Gauker: Semantics for deflationists
11: Dorothy Grover: How significant is the Liar?
12: Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten: The deflationists' axioms for truth
13: Alan Weir: Naive truth and sophisticated logic
14: Jody Azzouni: Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes