Readership: Advanced students and scholars of philosophy
Edited by Patrick Greenough, University of St Andrews, and Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh
"the volume is an especially valuable epistemological resource: it ushers us toward a deeper understanding of Williamson's epistemology. Here in a single volume are interesting new criticisms of Williamson's views, leveled by some epistemological heavyweights, and novel defenses of those views, defenses in which Williamson often supplements and further develops his earlier contributions. His pioneering work occupies an important place in epistemology, and this volume is a rich and welcome aid to those of us who have an interest in understanding and appreciating Williamson's work." - Tim Black, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard: Introduction 1: Tony Brueckner: E = K and Perceptual Knowledge 2: Quassim Cassam: Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed? 3: Elizabeth Fricker: Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against 4: Sanford Goldberg: The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge 5: Alvin Goldman: Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence 6: John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio: Knowledge and Objective Chance 7: Frank Jackson: Primeness, Internalism, Explanation 8: Mark Kaplan: Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism 9: Jonathan Kvanvig: Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries 10: Ram Neta: Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility 11: Stephen Schiffer: Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism 12: Ernest Sosa: Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits 13: Matthias Steup: Are Mental States Luminous? 14: Neil Tennant: Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia and Luminous Knowledge 15: Charles Travis: Aristotle's Condition 16: Timothy Williamson: Reponses to Critics
