Readership: Scholars and students of neuroscience, psychology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science
Carl F. Craver, Washington University, St Louis
"Given how much attention has been paid to neuroscience, it is little surprising how slow philosophy of science has been in exploring the philosophical issues involved in explaining the brain and using the brain to explain behaviour. Carl Craver's book...represents this new direction, and an excellent addition to a burgeoning field it is...Explaining the Brain is timely, well-written, and meticulously argued...I highly recommend this text to anyone with any interest in how theories in neuroscience are constructed...Craver's book set the bar high. It will be difficult indeed to surpass this work in the near future." - Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Preface Chapter 1. Introduction: Starting With Neuroscience 1: Introduction 2: Explanations in Neuroscience Describe Mechanisms. 3: Explanations in Neuroscience are Multilevel 4: Explanations in Neuroscience Integrate Multiple Fields 5: Criteria of Adequacy for an Account of Explanation Chapter 2. Explanation and Causal Relevance 1: Introduction 2: How Calcium Explains Neurotransmitter Release 3: Explanation and Representation 4: The Covering-Law Model 5: The Unification Model 6: But What About the Hodgkin and Huxley Model? 7: Conclusion Chapter 3. Causal Relevance and Manipulation 1: Introduction 2: The Mechanism of Long-Term Potentiation 3: Causation as Transmission 3.1: Transmission and Causal Relevance 3.2: Omission and Prevention 4: Causation and Mechanical Connection 5: Manipulation and Causation 5.1: Ideal Interventions 5.2: Invariance, Fragility, and Contingency 5.3: Manipulation and Criteria for Explanation 5.4: Manipulation, Omission, and Prevention 6: Conclusion Chapter 4. The Norms of Mechanistic Explanation 1: Introduction 2: Two Normative Distinctions 3: Explaining the Action Potential 4: The Explanandum Phenomenon 5: Components 6: Activities 7: Organization 8: Constitutive Relevance 8.1: Relevance and the Boundaries of Mechanisms 8.2: Interlevel Experiments and Constitutive Relevance 8.21: Interference Experiments 8.22: Stimulation Experiments 8.23: Activation Experiments 8.3: Constitutive Relevance as Mutual Manipulability 9: Conclusion Chapter 5. A Field-Guide to Levels 1: Introduction 2: Levels of Spatial Memory 3: A Field-Guide to Levels 3.1: Levels of Science (Units and Products) 3.2: Levels of Nature 3.21: Causal Levels (Processing and Control) 3.22: Levels of Size 3.23: Levels of Composition 3.231: Levels of Mereology 3.232: Levels of Aggregativity 3.233: Levels of Mere Material/Spatial Containment 3.3: Levels of Mechanisms 4: Conclusion Chapter 6 Nonfundamental Explanation 1: Introduction 2: Causal Relevance and Making a Difference 3: Contrasts and Switch-Points 4: Causal Powers at Higher Levels of Mechanisms 5: Causal Relevance among Realized Properties 6: Conclusion Chapter 7. The Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience 1: Introduction 2: Reduction and the History of Neuroscience 2.1: LTP's Origins: Not a Top-Down Search but Intralevel Integration 2.2: The Mechanistic Shift 2.3: Mechanism as a Working Hypothesis 3: Intralevel Integration and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience 3.1: The Space of Possible Mechanisms 3.2: Specific Constraints on the Space of Possible Mechanisms 3.21: Componency Constraints 3.22: Spatial Constraints 3.23: Temporal Constraints 3.24: Active Constraints 3.3: Reduction and the Intralevel Integration of Fields 4: Interlevel Integration and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience 4.1: What is Interlevel Integration? 4.2: Constraints on Interlevel Integration 4.21: Accommodative Constraints 4.22: Spatial and Temporal Interlevel Constraints 4.23: Interlevel Manipulability Constraints 4.3: Mosaic Interlevel Integration 5: Conclusion: The Epistemic Function of the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience
