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Readership: Philosophers with an interest in free will and moral responsibility.
Neil Levy, Florey Neuroscience Institutes, Australia, and Oxford Centre for Neuroethics
Neil Levy is Head of Neuroethics at the Florey Neuroscience Institutes and Director of Research at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics. He is the author of five previous books and many articles, on a wide range of topics including applied ethics, free will and moral responsibility, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mind. He divides his time between Melbourne, Australia, and Oxford, England.
"Hard Luck is important and challenging. Some of the arguments it directs at varieties of compatibilism, especially those concerning control, should generate much useful discussion. And Levy brings empirical research to bear fruitfully on issues like the effects of unconscious attitudes." - Steven Sverdlik, Mind
"[an] impressively wide-ranging book ... a no-frills and honest engagement with the issues by a creative philosopher, and it deserves to be read." - Neal A. Tognazzini, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
"All in all, Hard Luck is good philosophy: informed, clear and controversial." -
Brian Jonathan Garrett, Philosophy in Review, (2013), no. 3
Preface and Acknowledgements
2: An Account of Luck
3: Luck and Libertarianism
4: The Luck Problem for Compatibilists
5: The Epistemic Dimensions of Control
6: Akratic Freedom?
7: The Retreat to the Inner Citadel
8: Quality Of Will Theories And History-Insensitive Compatibilism
Visit Neil Levy's blog