Readership: Researchers, graduate students and professionals in Philosophy, Mathematics, Computer Science, Aritifical Intelligence and Mathematical Logic.
Neil Tennant, Arts & Humanities Distinguished Professor in Philosophy, and Adjunct Professor in Cognitive Science, The Ohio State University
Neil Tennant holds a BA in Mathematics and Philosophy, and a PhD in logic, from the University of Cambridge. His researches in Logic and Philosophy of Science have been supported by the British Academy, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Australian Research Council, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has held chairs in Philosophy at the University of Stirling and the Australian National University, and visiting professorships or fellowships at Dartmouth College, the University of Michigan, the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, The
ANU Institute for Advanced Studies, and Churchill College, Cambridge. He is currently Arts & Humanities Distinguished Professor in Philosophy at The Ohio State University.
"Tennant does not just propose a new and original way of thinking of belief systems, and their associated types of change; he also executes his research program in impressive detail...a significant and highly original contribution to philosophical logic by one of its leading practitioners." - Erik Olsson, Lund University, Sweden
"Neil Tennant is a highly original logician who looks at belief revision and related topics with a fresh eye, rejecting accepted paradigms and thinking outside the box. His book is a welcome addition to the field.
" - Rohit Parikh, The City University of New York, USA
Part I: Computational Considerations
2: Computing Changes in Belief
3: Global Conditions on Contraction
4: A Formal Theory of Contraction
5: Specification of a Contraction Algorithm
6: A Prolog Program for Contraction
7: Results of Running our Program for Contraction
Part II: Logical and Philosophical Considerations
8: Core Logic is the Inviolable Core of Logic
9: The Finitary Predicament
10: Mathematical Justifications are Not Infinitely Various
Part III: Comparisons
11: Differences with Other Formal Theories
12: Connections with Various Epistemological Accounts