Readership: Scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, neuroscience, psychology, and related disciplines.
Jakob Hohwy, Monash University
Jakob Hohwy is a philosopher engaged in both conceptual and experimental research. He works on problems in philosophy of mind about perception, neuroscience, and mental illness. At the same time, he collaborates with neuroscientists and psychiatrists, conducting experiments that put philosophical ideas to the test and that bring philosophical concerns into the lab. Hohwy completed his PhD at the Australian National University, his Masters degree at St Andrews University in Scotland, and his basic philosophy training in Denmark. He has set up the Philosophy and Cognition lab
in the Philosophy Department at Monash University in Melbourne.
"This is a wonderful and deep book. I have heard it said that it heralds a paradigm shift in cognitive neuroscience and perhaps neurophilosophy. It is an eloquent and accessible synthesis of recent advances in theoretical neurobiology, as they apply to the human brain and mind. I confess that I had thought about writing a book addressing the more technical themes but having read The Predictive Mind, I feel curiously complacent and content, because this book says everything that needed to be said and much more." - Karl Friston, University College London
"Every now and then a book appears that looks set to be a milestone in the
interdisciplinary study of mind. This is one of those rare and important books. The core organizing principle of mentality itself, Hohwy persuasively argues, is the prediction of our own ongoing streams of sensory input. Hohwy applies this principle to cases ranging from simple sensing all the way to hallucinations, delusions, consciousness, emotion, the sense of presence, and the nature of the self. A wonderful, timely, ground-breaking treatment, and required reading for anyone interested in the nature and possibility of mind." - Andy Clark FRSE, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh
Part I: The Mechanism
1: Perception as causal inference
2: Prediction error minimisation
3: Prediction error, context, and precision
4: Action and expected experience
Part II: The World
5: Binding is inference
6: Is predicting seeing?
7: Precarious prediction
8: Surprise and misrepresentation
Part III: The Mind
9: Precision, attention, and consciousness
10: Perceptual unity in action
11: The fragile mirror of nature
12: Into the predictive mind
Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction