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Ideology, Psychology, and Law
Edited by Jon Hanson
816 pages
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235x156mm
978-0-19-973751-2
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Hardback
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16 February 2012
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- Features the groundbreaking law-related research of political psychologists
- Includes leading legal scholars' commentary and analysis of political psychologists' work
- The first book to bring together experts to discuss the interaction between psychology, ideology, and law
Formally, the law is based solely on reasoned analysis, devoid of ideological biases or unconscious influences. Judges claim to act as umpires applying the rules, not making them. They frame their decisions as straightforward applications of an established set of legal doctrines, principles, and mandates to a given set of facts. As most legal scholars understand, however, the impression that the legal system projects is largely an illusion. As far back as 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. made a similar claim, writing that "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed."
More than a century later, we are now much closer to understanding the mechanisms responsible for the gap between the formal face of the law and the actual forces shaping it. Over the last decade or so, political scientists and legal academics have begun studying the linkages between ideologies, on one hand, and legal principles and policy outcomes on the other. During that same period, mind scientists have turned to understanding the psychological sources of ideology. This book is the first to bring many of the world's experts on those topics together to examine
the sometimes unsettling interactions between psychology, ideology, and law, and to better understand what, beyond and beneath the logic, animates the law.Readership: Scholars and students of political psychology, social psychology, social cognition, political science, and law. The book would be of interest to anyone teaching or taking a course or seminar on law and psychology or ideology and law. Some practicing lawyers and judges, as well as some trial consultants, would find the book valuable.
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Edited by Jon Hanson, Alfred Smart Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Jon Hanson is Alfred Smart Professor of Law and the Director of The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School. He is the editor and co-founder of The Situationist Blog, which provides a forum to discuss situational forces influencing law, policies, and social institutions. His award-winning teaching and scholarship meld social psychology, social cognition, economics, history, and law. Contributors:
Anne Alstott, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Yale University, New
Haven, CT; Linda Babcock, James M. Walton Professor of Economics, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA; Adam Benforado, Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA; Gary L. Blasi, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA; Robert C. Bordone, Thaddeus R. Beal Clinical Professor of Law, Director, Harvard Negotiation & Mediation Clinical Program , Harvard University, Cambridge, MA; Mitchell J. Callan, Lecturer in Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex; Kevin M. Carlsmith, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York; James Cavallaro, Clinical Professor of Law, Executive Director, Human Rights Program, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA; Martha Chamallas,
Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH; Rick M. Cheung, Undergraduate Student, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY; Geoffrey Cohen, Professor of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA; Peter H. Ditto, Professor of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA; Lee Epstein, Henry Wade Rogers Professor , Northwestern University, Chicago, IL; Joshua Furgeson, Researcher, Mathematica Policy Research, Cambridge, MA; Jon Hanson, Alfred Smart Professor of Law, Director, Project on Law and Mind Sciences, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA; Curtis D. Hardin, Associate Professor of Psychology, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY; John T. Jost , Professor of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY; Jerry Kang,
Professor of Law, Korea Times-Hankook Ilbo Chair, Law, Asian American Studies (by courtesy), University of California, Los Angeles, CA; Aaron C. Kay, Associate Professor of Management, Associate Professor of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC; Kathleen Kennedy, Doctoral Student of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; Eric D. Knowles, Assistant Professor of Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA; Douglas Kysar, Professor of Law, Yale University, New Haven, CT; Michael W. Magee, Doctoral Student of Psychology, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY; Andrew D. Martin, Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO; Thomas J. Miles, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL; Fernanda G. Nicola, Associate Professor of Law, American University, Washington, DC; Steven Noel, Doctoral Student of Psychology, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY; Brian A. Nosek, Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA; Andrew M. Perlman, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, MA; T. Andrew Poehlman, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX; Emily Pronin, Associate Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; Kevin M. Quinn, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA; Lindsay Rankin, Doctoral Student of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY; Lee Ross, Professor of Psychology, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA; Barry Schwartz, Dorwin Cartwright Professor of Social Theory and Social Action, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA; Jeffrey A. Segal, Distinguished Professor and Political Science Department Chair, State University of New York, Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY; Donna Shestowsky, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA; Avani Mehta Sood, Doctoral Student of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; Cass Sunstein, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law (on leave), Harvard University, Cambridge, MA; Tom R. Tyler, University Professor, New York University, New York, NY; Eric Luis Uhlmann, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois; Mark Yeboah, Associate, Ropes & Gray, LLP, Boston, MA; Kasumi Yoshimura, Doctoral
Student of Psychology , City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY
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Introduction
Chapter 1 - Introduction: Ideology, Psychology, and Law
Jon Hanson
Chapter 2 - The End of the End of Ideology
John Jost
Correlates and Causes of Ideology
Chapter 3 - System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice
Gary Blasi and John Jost
Chapter 4 - Interpersonal Foundations of Ideological Thinking
Curtis Hardin, Rick M. Cheung, Michael W. Magee, Steven Noel, and Kasumi Yoshimura
Chapter 5 - Crowding Out Morality: How the Ideology of Self-Interest Can Be Self-Fulfilling
Barry Schwartz
Chapter 5 Legal Comment - "A Fine is Not a Price": Insights for Law
Anne L. Alstott
Chapter 6 - Associations Between Law, Competitiveness, and the Pursuit of Self-Interest
Mitch Callan and Aaron Kay
Chapter 6 Legal Comment - "You Call, I Hammer!": Adversarial Legalism and Social Influence
Douglas Kysar
Chapter 7 - Automatic Associations: Personal Attitudes or Cultural Knowledge
Eric Uhlmann, Andrew Poehlman, and Brian Nosek
Chapter 7 Legal Comment
Jerry Kang
Chapter 8 - The Policy IAT
Jon Hanson and Mark Yeboah
Chapter 9 - Attributions and Ideologies: Two Divergent Visions of Human Behavior Behind Our Laws, Policies, and Theories
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
Protection and Preservation of Ideology
Chapter 10 - Preference, Principle, and Political Casuistry
Eric Knowles and Peter Ditto
Chapter 10 Legal Comment - Warm Reasoning and Legal Proof of Discrimination
Martha Chamallas
Chapter 11 - Identity, Belief, and Bias
Geoffrey Cohen
Chapter 11 Legal Comment - Remedying Law's Partiality Through Social Science
Andrew Perlman
Chapter 12 - Bias Perception and the Spiral of Conflict
Kathleen Kennedy and Emily Pronin
Chapter 12 Legal Comment - The Lawyer as Bias Buffer or Bias Aggravator
Robert Bordone
Chapter 13 - Seeing Bias: Discrediting and Dismissing Accurate Attributions
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
Ideology in Legal Theory and Law
Chapter 14 - Backlash: The Reaction to Mind Sciences in Legal Academia
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
Chapter 15 - The Mystique of Instrumentalism
Tom Tyler and Lindsay Rankin
Chapter 16 - Aggressive Interrogation and Retributitve Justice: A Proposed Psychological Model Retribution.
Avani Mehta Sood and Kevin Carlsmith
Legal Comment - How to Advocate Against Torture? Understanding and Countering the Dynamics of Support for Abusive Interrogation
James Cavallaro
Chapter 17 - Two Social Psychologists' Reflections on Situationism and the Criminal Justice System.
Lee Ross and Donna Shestowsky
Chapter 18 - What's Love Got to Do with It?: Stereotypical Women in Dispositionist Torts.
Fernanda Nicola
Chapter 19 - Legal Interpretation and Intuitions of Public Policy
Josh Furgeson and Linda Babcock
Chapter 20 - Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal
Chapter 21 - Depoliticizing Administrative Law
Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles
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The specification in this catalogue, including without limitation price, format, extent, number of illustrations, and month of publication, was as accurate as possible at the time the catalogue was compiled. Occasionally, due to the nature of some contractual restrictions, we are unable to ship a specific product to a particular territory. Jacket images are provisional and liable to change before publication.
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