Readership: Economists, political scientists, sociologists. Aimed predominantly at policy advisors, academics, and graduate students, some cross-over into advanced undergraduates.
The late Jean-Jacques Laffont, Professor of Economics, University of Toulouse
"deals with the subject in a refreshing piecemeal approach that will allow researchers to embed elements of the theory into their favourite political economy models." - Aslib Book Guide, Vol.65, Aug. 2000.
Chapter 1: Introduction Part I: Politicians as Informed Supervisors Chapter 2: The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design Chapter 3: An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers Chapter 4: Checks and Balances Part II: Flexibility versus Discretion in Constitutional Design Chapter 5: Political Economy and Industrial Policy Chapter 6: Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy Chapter 7: Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation Part III: Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design Chapter 8: Optimal Constitutional Responses to Coalition Formation Chapter 9: Collusion and Decentralization Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks
