Readership: Scholars and advanced students of philosophy
Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara
Introduction I. Transcendental Arguments against Skepticism 1: Transcendental Arguments I 2: Transcendental Arguments II 3: The Anti-Skeptical Strategy of the Refutation of Idealism 4: Modest Transcendental Arguments 5: Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism 6: Stroud's 'Transcendental Arguments' Reconsidered II. Semantic Answers to Skepticism 7: Brains in a Vat 8: Semantic Answers to Skepticism 9: Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses 10: Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge 11: Terms of Envatment 12: Charity and Skepticism 13: The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again 14: Singular Thought and Cartesian Philosophy III. Self-Knowledge 15: Scepticism about Knowledge of Content 16: Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World 17: Externalism and Memory 18: What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori 19: The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism 20: Brewer on the McKinsey Problem 21: Wright on the McKinsey Problem 22: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent 23: The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem IV. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 24: Epistemic Universalizability Principles 25: Why Nozick is a Sceptic 26: Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 27: Unfair to Nozick 28: Problems with the Wright Route to Scepticism 29: The Structure of the Skeptical Argument 30: Klein on Closure and Skepticism 31: The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism 32: Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge 33: Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamso 34: Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism 35: Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic 36: ~K~SK Acknowledgements Bibliography Index
